Journal of Research and Development in Comparative Law

Journal of Research and Development in Comparative Law

Defect Elimination from Broad Prosecutorial Discretion in the American Plea Bargaining Model through Digital Case Management: A Comparative Futures Study for the Iranian Criminal Justice System

Document Type : scientific research paper

Authors
Azim Aghababaei Taghanaki 1
Hossein Aghababaei 2
Mojtaba Ja`fari Moslem 3
1 Judge and PhD student, Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
2 Associate Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran
3 Judge & PhD student in Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran
10.22034/law.2025.2058797.1640
Abstract
Ple agreement, as a key tool in managing criminal cases, has become a widely used method to expedite proceedings with the expansion of managerial approaches in criminal justice systems, especially in the United States. However, the prosecutor’s broad discretionary powers in this process may lead to abuses such as violations of defendants’ rights, false confessions, and non-transparent decision-making. In Iran, the lack of a clear separation between prosecution and investigation—which often places the prosecutor in both roles—exacerbates these risks. Using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative review of library sources, this study, addresses the question of how digital case management can reduce the harms caused by the prosecutor’s unlimited powers if plea agreement is adopted in Iranian criminal justice system. Although plea agreement is not yet provided for in Iranian procedural laws, the growing managerial orientation within the judiciary increases the likelihood of its future acceptance. The findings indicate that the Case Management System (CMS), with its capability to record digital data, offers effective tools to mitigate the harms arising from the prosecutor’s broad powers.Video recording of the bargaining process, documenting justificatory evidence in the electronic file for presentation to the court, and digital screening of crimes based on severity enhance transparency and accountability. Video recording ensures oversight of prosecutorial behavior and the authenticity of agreements, recording justificatory evidence preserves adherence to the presumption of innocence, and digital screening prioritizes cases, allocating judicial resources to serious crimes. This study is the first to propose that digital case management limits prosecutorial abuse and increases public trust in Iranian criminal justice system. For the fair implementation of charge bargaining, it is recommended that: (1) regulations for mandatory video recording with technical standards be codified; (2) recording justificatory evidence in the CMS be required as a prerequisite for bargaining; (3) crime-oriented screening algorithms be designed to prioritize cases; and (4) periodic reports on the CMS performance be published for public oversight. These measures, by combining technology and supervision, will pave the way for the fair and efficient implementation of charge bargaining in Iranian future criminal justice system.
Keywords
Plea Bargaining
Digital Case Management
New Public Management
Case Management System
Prosecutor&‌rsquo؛ s Discretion

Subjects

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